We present a symbolic machinery that admits both probabilistic and causal information about a given domain and produces proba bilistic statements about the effect of actions and the impact of observations. The calculus admits two types of conditioning operators:
INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic methods, especially those based on graphical models, have proven useful in tasks of predic tion, abduction and belief revision [Pearl 1988 , Beck erman 1990, Goldszmidt 1992, Darwiche 1993] . In planning, however, they are less popular, 1 partly due to the unsettled, strange relationship between proba bility and actions. In principle, actions are not part of standard probability theory, and understandably so: probabilities capture normal relationships in the world, while actions represent interventions that per turb those relationships. It is no wonder, then, that ac tions are treated as foreign entities throughout the lit erature on probability and statistics; they serve neither as arguments of probability expressions nor as events for conditioning such expressions. Even in the decision theoretic literature, where actions are the target of op1Works by Dean & Ka.naza.wa. [1989) and Kushmerick et al. [1993] notwithstanding. timization, the symbols given to actions serve merely as indices for distinguishing one probability function from another, not as propositions that specify the im mediate effects of the actions. As a result, if we are given two probabilities, P A and Ps, denoting the prob abilities prevailing under actions A or B, respectively, there is no way we can deduce from this input the prob ability PAA B corresponding to the joint action A 1\ B, or any Boolean combination of the propositions A and B. This means that, in principle, the impact of all anticipated joint actions would need to be specified in advance-an insurmountable task by any standard.
The peculiar status of actions in probability theory can be seen most clearly in comparison to the status of observations. By specifying a probability function P( s) on the possible states of the world, we automat ically specify how probabilities would change with ev ery conceivable observation e, since P(s) permits us to compute (using Bayes rule) the posterior probabil ities P(Eie) for every pair of events E and e. How ever, specifying P(s) tells us nothing about how our probabilities should be revised as a response to an ex ternal action A. In general, if an action A is to be de scribed as a function that takes P( s) and transforms it to P A ( s) , then Bayesian conditioning is clearly inade quate for encoding this transformation. For example, consider the statements: "I have observed the barom eter reading to be x " and "I intervened and set the barometer reading to x" . If processed by Bayes con ditioning on the event "the barometer reading is x " , these two reports would have the same impact on our current probability function, yet we certainly do not consider the two reports equally informative about an incoming storm.
The engineering solution to this problem is to include the acting agents as variables in the analysis, construct a distribution function including the behavior of those agents, and infer the effect of the action by condition ing those "agent variables" to a particular mode of behavior. Thus, for example, the agent manipulat ing the barometer would enter the system as a vari able such as, "Squeezing the barometer" or "Heating the barometer". After incorporating this variable into the probability distribution, we could infer the impact of manipulating the barometer by simply conditioning the distribution on the event "Squeezing the barometer reached level x". This is, in effect, the solution adopted in influence diagrams (IDs), the graphical tool pro posed for decision theory [Howard & Matheson 1981 , Shachter 1986 . Each anticipated action is represented as a variable (a node in the diagram), and its impact on other variables is assessed and encoded in terms of conditional probabilities, similar to the impact of any other parent node in the diagram.
The difficulties with this approach are twofold. First , the approach is procedural (rather than declarative) and therefore lacks the semantics necessary for sup porting symbolic derivations of the effects of actions.
We will see in Section 3 that such derivations be come indispensable in processing partially specified di agrams. Second, the need to anticipate and represent all relevant actions in advance renders the elicitation process unduly cumbersome. In circuit diagnosis, fo r example, it would be awkward to represent every con ceivable act of component replacement (similarly, ev ery conceivable connection to a voltage source, cur rent source, etc.) as a node in the diagram. Instead, the effects of such actions are implicit in the circuit diagram itself and can be inferred directly from the (causal) Bayesian network that represents the work ings of the circuit. 2 We therefore concentrate our discussion on knowledge bases where actions are not represented explicitly. Rather, each action will be in dexed by a proposition which describes the condition we wish to enforce directly. Indirect consequences of these conditions will be inferred from the causal relationships among the variables represented in the knowledge base.
As an alternative to Bayesian conditioning, philoso phers [Lewis 1976 ] have studied another probability transformation called "imaging" which was deemed useful in the analysis of subjunctive conditionals and which more adequately represents the transformations associated with actions. Whereas Bayes condition ing P(sle) transfers the entire probability mass from states excluded by e to the remaining states (in pro portion to their current P(s)), imaging works differ ently: each excluded state s transfers its mass in dividually to a select set of states S*(s), considered "closest" to s. While providing a more adequate and general framework for actions, imaging leaves the pre cise specification of the selection function s· ( s ) almost unconstrained. The task of formalizing and represent ing these specifications can be viewed as the proba-2 Causal information can in fact be viewed as an implicit encoding of responses to future actions, and, in practice, causal information is assumed and used by most decision analysts. The ID literature's insistence on divorcing the links in the ID from any causal interpretation [Howard & Matheson 1981, Howard 1989 ] is, therefore, at odds with prevailing practice. Section 2 of this paper can be viewed as a way to formalize and reinstate the causal reading of influence diagrams.
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bilistic version of the infamous frame problem and its two satellites, the ramification and concurrent actions problems.
An assumption commonly found in the literature is that the effect of an elementary action do(q) is merely to change •q to q where the current state satisfies •q and, otherwise, to leave things unaltered. 3 We can call this assumption the "delta" rule, variants of which are embedded in STRIPS as well as in probabilistic plan ning systems. In BURIDAN [Kushmerick et al. 1993] , for example, every action is specified as a probabilistic mixture of several elementary actions, each operating under the delta rule.
The problem with the delta rule and its variants is that they do not take into account the indirect ramifi cations of an action such as, for example, those triggered by chains of causally related events. To handle such ram ifications, we must construct a causal theory of the domain, specifying which event chains are likely to be triggered by a given action (the ramification problem) and how these chains interact when triggered by sev eral actions (the concurrent action problem). Elabo rating on the works of Dean and Wellman [1991] , this paper shows how the frame, ramification, and concur rency problems can be handled effectively using the language of causal graphs, (see also [Darwiche & Pearl 1994] ).
The key idea is that causal knowledge can efficiently be organized in terms of just a fe w basic mechanisms, each involving a relatively small number of variables and each encoded as a set of fu nctional constraints perturbed by random disturbances. Each external el ementary action overrules just one mechanism while leaving the others unaltered. The specification of an action then requires only the identification of the mechanisms that are overruled by that action. Once these mechanisms are identifi ed, the effect of the ac tion (or combinations thereof) can be computed fr om the constraints imposed by the remaining mechanisms.
The semantics behind causal graphs and their relations to actions and belief networks have been discussed in prior publications [Pearl & Verma 1991 , Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992 , Druzdzel & Simon 1993 , Pearl 1993a , Spirtes et al . 1993 , Pearl 1993b . In Spirtes Elt al. [1993] and later in Pearl [1993b] , fo r example, it was shown how graphical representation can be used to facilitate quantitative predictions of the effects of in terventions, including interventions that were not con templated during the network's construction. Section 2 reviews this aspect of causal networks, following the fo rmulation in [Pearl 1993b ].
The main problem addressed in this paper is quantifi cation of the effects of interventions when the causal graph is not fu lly parameterized, that is, when we are 3This assumption corresponds to Dalal's [1988] database update, which uses the Hamming distance to de fine the �closest world" in Lewis's imaging.
given the topology of the graph but not the conditional probabilities on all variables. In this situation, numer ical probabilities are given to only a subset of vari ables, in the form of unstructured conditional prob ability sentences. This is a unless you have a com parative realistic setting in AI applications, where the user/designer might not have either the patience or the knowledge necessary for specifi cation of a com plete distribution function; some combinations of vari ables may be too esoteric to be assigned probabilities, and some variables may be too hypothetical (e.g., "life style" or "attitude") to even be parameterized numer ically.
To manage this problem, this paper introduces a calcu lus that operates on whatever probabilistic and causal information is available and, using symbolic transfor mations on the input sentences, produces probabilis tic assessments of the effects of actions. The calculus admits two types of conditioning operators: ordinary Bayes conditioning, P(y\X = x ) ; and causal condi tioning, P(yido(X = x)), that is, the probability of Y = y conditioned on holding X constant (at x) by deliberate external action.4 Given a causal graph and an input set of conditional probabilities, the calcu lus derives new conditional probabilities of both the Bayesian and the causal types and, whenever possi ble, generates closed form expressions for the effect of interventions in terms of the input information.
2
THE MANIPULATIVE READING OF CAUSAL NETWORKS: A
REVIEW
The connection between the probabilistic and the ma nipulative readings of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) is formed through Simon's [1977] mechanism-based model of causal ordering.5 In this model, each child parent family in a DAG G represents a deterministic function (1) where pa; are the parents of variable X; m G, and f;, 0 < i < n, are mutually independent, arbitrarily distributed random disturbances. A causal theory is a pair < P, G >, where G is a DAG and P is the probability distribution that results from the functions /; in (1) .
Characterizing each child-parent relationship as a de terministic function, instead of the usual conditional probability P(x; I pa1), imposes equivalent indepen dence constraints on the resulting distributions and 4The notation set(X = x) was used in [Pearl 1993b ), while do(X = x) was used in [Goldszmidt and Pearl1992) .
5This mechanism-based model was adopted in [Pearl & Verma 1991] for defining probabilistic causal theories. It has been elaborated in Druzdzel & Simon [1993] and is also the basis for the "invariance" principle of Spirtes et al. [1993] .
leads to the same recursive decomposition P(xt. ... , Xn) = IJ P( x; I pa 1)
that characterizes Bayesian networks [Pearl 1988 ]. This is so because each f; is independent on all non descendants of X;. However, the functional character ization X; = f,(pa;, £;)also specifies how the resulting distribution would change in response to external in terventions, since, by convention, each function is pre sumed to remain constant unless specifi cally altered. Moreover, the nonlinear character of/; permits us to treat changes in the function/; itself as a variable, F;, by writing X; = /[{pa;, F;, t:; ) (3) where
Thus, any external intervention F; that alters /; can be represented graphically as an added parent node of X;, and the effect of such an intervention can be analyzed by Bayesian conditionalization, that is, by simply setting this added parent variable to the ap propriate value f;.
The simplest type of external intervention is one in which a single variable, say X;, is forced to take on some fixed value, say, x�. Such intervention, which we call atomic, amounts to replacing the old functional mechanism X; = /;(pa;, £i) with a new mechanism X; = x� governed by some external force F; that sets the value x�. If we imagine that each variable Xi could potentially be subject to the influence of such an ex ternal force F;, then we can view the causal network G as an efficient code for predicting the effects of atomic interventions and of various combinations of such in terventions.
The effect of an atomic intervention do(X; = xD is encoded by adding to G a link F; --+ X; (see Fig   ure 1 ), where F; is a new variable taking values in {do(xD, idle}, xi ranges over the domain of X,, and idle represents no intervention. Thus, the new parent set of X; in the augmented network is pa: = pa1 U{ Fi }, and it is related to X; by the conditional probability where P' is the distribution specified by the augmented . network G' = GU {F;-+ X;} and Eq. (4), with an ar bitrary prior distribution on F;. In general, by adding a hypothetical intervention link F; -+ X; to each node in G, we can construct an augmented probability func tion P'(.r1, . .. , xn; Ft, ... , Fn) that contains information about richer types of interventions. Multiple interven tions would be represented by conditioning P' on a subset of the F;'s (taking values in their respective do(xD), while the pre-intervention probability func tion P would be viewed as the posterior distribution induced by conditioning each F; in P' on the value idle.
This representation yields a simple and direct trans formation between the pre-intervention and the post intervention distributions:6
This transformation reflects the removal of the term P(x; I pa;) from the product decomposition of Eq.
(2), since pa; no longer influence X;. Graphically, the removal of this term is equivalent to removing the links between pa; and X;, while keeping the rest of the net work intact.
The transformation (6) exhibits the following proper ties:
1. An intervention do(x;) can affect only the descen dants of X; in G. 2. For any set S of variables, we have P :�: ; (S I pa;) = P (S I x ;, pa ;) (7) In other words, given X; = x; and pa;, it is super fluous to find out whether X; = x; was established by external intervention or not. This can be seen directly from the augmented network G' (see Fig   ure 1 ), since {X;} U pa; d-separates F; from the rest of the network, thus legitimizing the condi tional independence S JL F; I (X;, pa ; ).
3. A sufficient condition for an external intervention do(X; = x;) to have the same effect on X; as the passive observation X; = x; is that X; d-separates pai from Xi, that is, P'(x;ldo(x;)) = P(x; I xi) iff X; II pa; I X; -
6Eq. (6) is a special case of the Manipulation The orem of Spirtes et al. (1993] which deals with interven tions that modify several conditional probabilities simulta neously. According to this source, Eq. (6) was "indepen dently conjectured by Fienberg in a seminar in 1991". An additive version of Eq. (6) was independently presented in
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The immediate implication of Eq. (6) is that, given the structure of the causal network G, one can infer post intervention distributions from pre-intervention distri butions; hence, we can reliably estimate the effects of interventions from passive (i.e., nonexperimental) observations. However, use of Eq. (6) is limited for several reasons. First, the formula was derived under the assumption that the pre-intervention probability P is given by the product of Eq. (2), which represents general domain knowledge prior to making any spe cific observation. Second, the formula in Eq. (6) is not very convenient in practical computations, since the joint distribution P(x1, ... , X n) is represented not explicitly but implicitly, in the form of probabilistic sentences from which it can be computed. Finally, the formula in Eq. (6) presumes that we have suffi cient information at hand to define a complete joint distribution function. In practice, a complete specifi cation of P is rarely available, and we must predict the effect of actions from a knowledge base containing un structured collection of probabilistic statements, some observational and some causal.
The first issue is addressed in [Pearl 1993a and Balke & Pearl 1994] , where assumptions about persistence are added to the knowledge base to distinguish prop erties that terminate as a result of an action from those that persist despite that action. This paper addresses the latter two issues It offers a set of sound (and pos sibly complete) inference rules by which probabilistic sentences involving actions and observations can be transformed to other such sentences, thus providing a syntactic method of deriving (or verifying) claims about actions and observations. We will assume, how ever, that the knowledge base contains the topological structure of the causal network G, that is, some of its links are annotated with conditional probabilities while others remain unspecified. Given such a par tially specified causal theory, our main problem will be to facilitate the syntactic derivation of expressions of the form P(xildo(x;)).
A CALCULUS OF ACTIONS
PRELIMINARY NOTATION
Let X, Y, Z, W be four arbitrary disjoint sets of nodes in the DAG G. We say that X andY are independent given Z in G, denoted (X _ II YI Z)a, if the set Z d separates X from Y in G. We denote by Gx (G� _ _, respectively) the graph obtained by deleting from G all arrows pointing to (emerging from, respectively) nodes in X.
Finally, we replace the expression P(yldo(x), z ) by a shorter expression P(yli:, z), using the ' symbol to identify the variables that are kept constant externally. In words, the expression P(yli:, z ) stands for the prob ability of Y = y given that Z = z is observed and X is held constant at x. 
INFERENCE RULES
Armed with this notation, we are now able to formu late the three basic inference rules of the proposed cal culus.
Theorem 3.1 Given a causal theory < P, G >, for any sets of variables X, Y, Z, W we have:
Rule 1 Insertion/deletion of observations (Bayes conditioning)
Rule 2 Action/observation exchange
EXAMPLE
We will now demonstrate how these inference rules can be used to quantify the effect of actions, given partially specified causal theories. Consider the causal theory < P(x, y, z), G >, where G is the graph given in Fig  ure 2 below and P(x, y, z) is the distribution over the o U (Unobserved)
./ . � X z Figure 2 y Rule 3 Insertion/deletion of actions observed variables X, Y, Z. Since U is unobserved, the theory is only partially specified; it will be impossi-
ble to infer all required parameters, such as P(u) or yx,z, w = yx,w 1 -' G -x zcw) P(y l z,u). We will see, however, that this structure where Z (W) is the set of Z nodes that are not still permits us to quantify, using our calculus, the efancestors of any W node in G x.
feet of every action on every observed variable.
Each of the inference rules above can be proven from the basic interpretation of the "do{x)" operation as a replacement of the causal mechanism t.hat connects X to its parent prior to the action with a new mechanism X = x introduced by the intervening force (as in Eqs. 7 This condition was named the "back-door" criterion in [Pearl 1993b ], echoing the requirement that only indi rect paths from Z to Y be d-separated; these paths can be viewed as entering Z through the back door. An equiva lent, though more complicated, graphical criterion is given in Theorem 7.1 of (Spirtes et al. 1993 ].
The applicability of each inference rule requires that certain d-separation conditions hold in some graph, whose structure will vary with the expressions to be manipulated. Figure 3 displays the graphs that will be needed for the derivations that follow.
• Figure 3 Task-1, compute P(z l x) This task can be accomplished in one step, since G satisfies the applicability condition for Rule 2, namely X II Z in G x (because the path X <-U -+ Y <-Z is blocked by t he collider at Y), and we can write P(z l x) == P(z l x) (9)
Task-2, compute P(y l z) Here we cannot apply Rule 2 to substitute z for z because Gz contains a back-door path from Z toY.
Naturally, we would like to "block" this path by con ditioning on variables (such as X) that reside on that path. Symbolically, this operation involves condition ing and summing over all values of X, P(y l z) = 2:: P(y l x, i)P(x l i) (10)
We now have to deal with two expressions involving z, P(ylx, z) and P(xi.Z). The latter can be readily computed by applying Rule 3 for action deletion:
noting that, indeed, X and Z are d-separated in Gz.
(This can be seen immediately from Figure 2 ; manip ulating Z will have no effect on X.) To reduce the former quantity, P(yjx, i), we consult Rule 2
and note that X d-separates Z from Y in G z. This allows us to write Eq. (10) as
which is a special case of the back-door formula [Pearl 1993b , Eq. (11) We are now ready to tackle the evaluation of P(yjx), which cannot be reduced to an observational expres sion by direct application of any of the inference rules.
Task-3, compute P(yjx)
we see that the term P(z!x) was reduced in Eq. (9) while no rule can be applied to eliminate the manipu lation symbol · from the term P(yjz, i:). However, we can add a · symbol to this term via Rule 2
since Figure 3 shows
We can now delete the action x from P(ylz, i:) using Rule 3, since Y � � � � X!Z holds in Gxz· Thus, we have P(yjz, i:) = P(ylz )
( 1 6) which was calculated in Eq. (13). Substituting Eqs. (13), (16), and (9) back into Eq. (14) finally yields
In contrast to the back-door formula of Eq. (13) Task-4, compute P(y, zji:) P(y , z!i:) = P(yjz, i: )P( z! x) (18) The two terms on the r.h.s. were derived before in Eqs. (9) and (16), from which we obtain P(y , zl x) = P(y ji) P( zjx) = P( z \x ) I:x' P(yj:c', z )P(x')
DISCUSSION
Computing the effects of actions by using partial theo ries in which probabilities are specified on a select sub set of (observed) variables is an extremely important task in statistics and socio-economic modeling, since it determines when causal effects are "identifiable" (i.e., estimable consistently from non-experimental data) and this when randomized experiments are not needed. The calculus proposed here, reduces the problem of identifiability to the problem of finding a sequence of transformations, each conforming to one of the infer ence rules in Theorem 3.1, which reduces an expression of the form P(yli:) to a standard (i.e., hat-free) prob ability expression. Note that whenever a reduction is possible, the calculus provides a closed form expression for the desired causal effect.
The proposed calculus uncovers many new structures that permit the identification of causal effects from nonexperimental observations. For example, the struc ture of Figure 3 represents a large class of observa tional studies in which the causal effect of an action (X ) can be determined by measuring a variable (Z) that mediates the interaction between the action and its effect (Y ). Most of the literature on statistical ex perimentation considers the measurement of interme diate variables, affected by the action, to be useless, if not harmful, for causal inference [Cox 1958 , Pratt & Schlaifer 1988 . The relevance of such structures in practical situations can be seen, for instance, if we identify X with smoking, Y with lung cancer, Z with the amount of tar deposited in a subject's lungs, and U with an unobserved carcinogenic genotype that, ac cording to the tobacco industry, also induces an in born craving for nicotine. In this case, Eq. (17) would provide us with the means to quantify, from nonexper imental data, the causal effect of smoking on cancer.
(Assuming, of course, that the data P(x, y, z) is made available and that we believe that smoking does not have any direct causal effect on lung cancer except that mediated by tar deposits).
In this example, we were able to compute answers to all possible queries of the form P(yj z , i:) where Y, Z, and X are subsets of observed variables. In general, this will not be the case. For example, there is no general way of computing P(yji:) from the observed distribution whenever the causal model contains the subgraph shown in Figure 4 , where X and Y are adja- unobserved variable.8 Similarly, our ability to com pute P(yji) for every pair of singleton variables does not ensure our ability to compute joint distributions, such as P(Yt, Y2Jx). Figure 5 , for example, shows a causal graph where both P(yd.i) and P(y2]x) are com putable, but P(y 1 , Y2Ji) is not; consequently, we can not compute P(zji). Interestingly, the graph of Figure  5 is the smallest graph that does not contain the pat tern of Figure 4 and still presents an uncomputable causal effect. Graphical criteria for identifiability and nonidentifiability are given in [Pearl 1994} .
Another interesting feature demonstrated by the net work in Figure 5 is that it is often easier to compute the effects of a joint action than the effects of its con stituent singleton actions9. In this example, it is pos sible to compute P(zji, !h) and P(zji:, 111), yet there is no way of computing P(zji). For example, the former can be evaluated by invoking Rule 2, giving
On the other hand, Rule 2 cannot be applied to the computation of P(y 1 Ji:, y2) because, conditioned on Y2, X and Yt are d-connected in Gx (through the dashed lines). We conjecture, however, that when ever P(yji:;) is computable for every singleton Xi, then P(y]i1. .i2, . .. , xt) is computable as well, for any subset of variables {Xt, ... , X1}.
Our calculus is not limited to the derivation of causal probabilities from noncausal probabilities; we can de rive conditional and causal probabilities from causal expressions as well. For example, given the graph of Figure 2 together with the quantities P(zjx) and P(yji), we can derive an expression for P(yjx),
z 8 0ne can calculate strict upper and lower bounds on P(yjx) and these bounds may coincide for special distribu tions, P( x, y, z ) [Balke & Pearl 1994 ), but there is no way of computing P(ylx) for every distribution P(x, y, z).
9The fact that the two tasks are not equivalent was brought to my attention by James Robins, who has worked out many of these computations in the context of sequential treatment management [Robins 1989 ).
using the steps that led to Eq. {16). Note that this derivation is still valid when we add a common cause to X and Z, which is the most general condition un der which the transitivity of causal relationships holds. In [Pearl 1994 ] we present conditions for transforming P(yjx) into expressions in which only members of Z obtain the hat symbol. These would enable an agent to measure P(yjx) by manipulating a surrogate variable, Z, which is easier to control than X.
3.5
CONDITIONAL ACTIONS AND
STOCHASTIC POLICIES
The interventions considered thus far were uncondi tional actions that merely force a variable or a group of variables X to take on some specified value x. In general, interventions may involve complex policies in which a variable X is made to respond in a specified way to some set Z of other variables, say through a functional relationship X = g( Z) or through a stochas tic relationship whereby X is set to x with probability P*(xlz). We will show that computing the effect of such policies is equivalent to computing the expression P(yjx, z).
Let P(yjdo(X = g(Z))) stand for the distribution (of Y) prevailing under the policy (X = g(Z)). To com pute P(yjdo(X = g(Z))), we condition on Z and write
The equality
stems, of course, from the· fact that Z cannot be a descendant of X, hence, whatever control one exerts on X, it can have no effect on the distribution of Z.
Thus, we see that the causal effect of a policy X = g(Z) can be evaluated directly from the expression of P(yjx, z), simply by substituting g(z) for x and taking the expectation over Z (using the observed distribu tion P(z)).
The identifiability condition for policy intervention is somewhat stricter than that for a simple intervention. Clearly, whenever a policy do(X = g(Z)) is identifi able, the simple intervention do(X = x) is identifi able as well, as we can always get the latter by setting g(Z) = X. The converse, does not hold, however, because conditioning on Z might create dependencies that will prevent the successful reduction of P(yjx, z ) to a hat-free expression.
A stochastic policy, which imposes a new conditional distribution P*(xjz) for x, can be handled in a similar manner. We regard the stochastic intervention as a random process in which the unconditional interven tion do(X = x) is enforced with probability P*(xiz). Thus, given Z = z, the intervention set(X = x) will occur with probability P*(xiz) and will produce a causal effect given by P(y!x, z). Averaging over x and z gives P(yiP*(xlz)) = L L P(ylx, z)P*(xiz)P(z) r z
Since P'"(x!z) is specified externally, we see again that the identifiability of P(ylx, z) is a necessary and suffi cient condition for the identifiability of any stochastic policy that shapes the distribution of X by the out come of Z.
Of special importance in planning is a STRIP-like ac tion whose immediate effects X = x depend on the satisfaction of some enabling precondition C(w) on a set W of variables. To represent such actions, we let Z = WUpax and set
It should be noted, however, that in planning appli cations the effect of an action may be to invalidate its preconditions. To represent such actions, tempo rally indexed causal networks are necessary [Dean & Kanazawa 1989 , Pearl 1993a , Balke & Pearl 1994 ).
CONCLUSIONS
The calculus proposed in this paper captures in sym bols and graphs the conceptual distinction between seeing and doing. While many systems have imple mented this obvious distinction-from early systems of adaptive control to their modern AI counterparts of [Dean and Kanazawa 1989] and [Draper et al. 1994 ) the belief-changing operators of seeing and doing can now enjoy the power of symbolic manipulations. The calculus permits the derivation of expressions for states of belief that result from sequences of actions and ob servations, which, in turn, should permit the identifi cation of variables and relationships that are crucial for the success of a given plan or strategy. The ex ercise in Section 3.3, for example, demonstrates how predictions about the effects of actions can be derived from passive observations even though portions of the knowledge base (connected with the unobserved vari able U) remain inaccessible. Another possible applica tion of the proposed calculus lies in the area of learn ing, where it migh t facilitate the integration of the two basic modes of human learning: learning by manipu lation and learning by observation.
The immediate beneficiaries of the proposed calculus would be social scientists and clinical trilists, as the calculus enables experimental researchers to translate complex considerations of causal interactions into a formal language, thus facilitating the following tasks:
1. Explicate the assumptions underlying the model. 2. Decide whether the assumptions are sufficient for obtaining consistent estimates of the target quan tity: the total effect of one variable on another. 3. If the answer to item 2 is affirmative, the method provides a closed-form expression for the target quantity, in terms of distributions of observed quantities. 4. If the answer to item 2 is negative, the method suggests a set of observations and experiments which, if performed, would render a consistent es timate feasible.
The bizzare confusion and controversy surrounding the role of causality in statistics stems largely from the lack of mathematical notation for defining, expressing, and manipulating causal relationships. Statisticians will benefit, therefore, from a calculus that integrates both statistical and causal information, and in which causal influences are kept distinct from probabilistic dependencies.
There are also direct applications of action calculus to expert systems and Bayesian networks technology.
One conceptual contribution, mentioned in Section 1, is the appeal to causality for inferring the effect of certain actions without those actions being explicitly encoded in the knowledge base. This facility simplifies the knowledge elicitation process by focusing atten tion on causal relationships and by dispensing with the specification of actions whose effects can be in ferred from those relationships.
A second contribution involves the treatment of hid den variables. Such variables represent factors that the expert chooses to exclude from formal analysis, either because they lie beyond the scope of the domain or be cause they are inaccessible to measurement. The ex ample of Section 3.3 demonstrates that certain queries can be answered precisely without the parameters as sociated with hidden variables assessing. Action cal culus should identify the conditions under which such assessments can be saved.
